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THE	 DAO	 OF	 POLITICS:	 LI	 (RITUALS/RITES)	 AND	







ever,	 there	 is	 hardly	 any	 discussion	 of	 Chinese	 philosophy	 in	 Dewey’s	 published	
works	or	even	his	papers	and	correspondence.	Among	his	rare	mentions	of	Chinese	





















taining	 social	 order	 and	 dealing	 with	 crises	 (L2	:	262;	 M7	:	399).	As	 a	 principle	 of	
organization	(M6	:	413),	customs	consist	of	the	various	ways	in	which	key	relation-
ships	in	a	society	are	regulated	(L7	:	50).	They	are	“approved	ways	of	acting,	common	

















important	 relationships,	 facilitating	 social	 interaction,	 and	 “Of	 the	 things	 brought	
about	by	the	rites	[li],	harmony	is	the	most	valuable”	(Analects	12.1).	Confucian	li,	
like	Dewey’s	customs,	are	also	means	of	dealing	with	the	crises	of	life	such	as	war	
























munities	 resolved	 conflicts	 through	 mediation	 by	 their	 elders.	 Recent	 writings	 on	
Chinese	law	by	Western	scholars	still	refer	to	a	“sometimes	ambivalent	attitude	that	
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Chinese	 popular	 culture	 maintained	 towards	 the	 likelihood	 that	 justice	 could	 be	
achieved	through	resort	to	formal	state	sanctioned	legal	institutions	and	practices.”9









































rule	of	 law	 in	China,	critics	worry	 that	 this	product	of	Western	society	cannot	be	






William	 Alford	 contends	 that	 those	 who	 accept	 at	 face	 value	 the	 Confucian	
worldview	 of	 government	 as	 effecting	 social	 order	 through	 moral	 transformation	
rather	than	legal	restraint	tend	to	underestimate	the	role	of	law	throughout	Chinese	


















of	 government,	 and	a	good	government	 that	 cares	 about	 social	harmony	and	 the	
people’s	virtues	and	welfare	should	aim	to	minimize	its	own	use	of	such	negative	
















































































seems	 fairly	established;	 the	Han	 lexicon,	Shuowen jiezi	說文解字,	explains	 fa	 in	
terms	of	xing.	The	Duan	commentary,	instead	of	treating	this	as	a	reduction	from	a	
broader	meaning,	 treats	xing	 as	 the	primary	meaning	of	 fa,	which	had	been	“ex-
tended	to	mean	all	models.”35	However,	Chad	Hansen	argues	against	the	meaning-
change	thesis	and	maintains	that	fa	means	not	“laws”	but	“objective	standards”	even	































reaucratic	 or	 regulatory	 law	 in	 being	 positive	 and	 public.41	 Criticizing	 Unger’s	






behavior	 were	 written	 into	 the	 dynastic	 statutes.	 Ch’ü	T’ung-tsu’s	 study	 of	 “tradi-
tional	Chinese	law”	(from	the	Han	dynasty	to	the	Qing	dynasty)	is	as	much	about	li	
as	it	is	about	fa.43
Ainsworth	 sees	 li	 and	 fa	 as	 “two	 competing	 normative	 legal	 concepts.”	This	
















The	Confucian	 tendency	 to	 treat	 li	as	 imposing	moral	constraints	on	statutory	
























which	makes	customs	 the	 source	of	 law	 (E4	:	40;	 L14	:	118).	On	one	occasion,	he	
actually	asserted	that	“all	laws	except	those	which	regulate	technical	procedures	are	
registrations	of	existing	social	customs	and	their	attendant	moral	habits	and	p	urposes”	




















means	 of	 compulsion,	 while	 Confucian	 li	 overlaps	 with	 customs	 in	 requiring	 the	
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subjective	 disposition	 to	 conform.	When	 li	 descends	 to	 using	objective	means	of	
compulsion,	it	degenerates	from	ethical	ideal	or	virtue	to	custom	or	even	law.	Law	











































“rules	 of	 recognition,”	 secondary	 rules	 setting	 out	 the	 criteria	 of	 legal	 validity	—	
“customs	 do	 not	 become	 law	 in	 any	 juridical	 sense	 until	 they	 are	 authoritatively	
stated	or	 formulated”	 (L3	:	327)	—	to	one	closer	 to	 the	conception	of	 law	 found	 in	




































































nal	 preconditions	 or	 consequences.	 Once	 the	 laws	 are	 removed	 or	 if	 a	 person	






















sense	of	 shame	 rather	 than	 result	 in	blind	and	mechanical	 following	of	 the	 ritual	
norms	that	will	maintain	order	only	in	fairly	static	conditions.
One	could	argue	that	Confucius	was	quite	aware	of	how	li	could	degenerate	into	
no	 more	 than	 mechanical	 habit	 or	 compliance	 for	 external	 reasons,	 and	 that	 he	
would	rather	have	people	ignore	li	than	follow	them	only	for	form’s	sake	or	for	the	








exemplary	 li	and	are	meaningless.	Unless	 the	performance	comes	 from	the	heart-
mind,	with	the	recognition	that	something	is	the	appropriate	thing	to	do,	and	more-


































of	Confucius’	“rectification	of	names”	 (zhengming)	 is	 to	ensure	 that	“punishments	
will	fit	the	crimes”	so	that	“the	people	will	know	where	to	put	hand	and	foot”	(Ana-
lects	13.3).	It	becomes	much	more	pronounced	in	the	Xunzi,	which	advocates	that	

















weakness.56	 Entrenched	 customs	 prevented	 intelligent	 solutions	 to	 new	 problems	







































ples,	 they	 are	 particular	 mores,	 values	 and	 guidelines	 for	 human	 interaction	 of	 a	




tices,	 and	 preparing	 the	 way	 for	 evaluating	 habits	 and	 customs.63	 In	 general,	 the	
Chinese	 traditional	discourse	on	 li	 paid	more	attention	 to	 intentional	 “top-down”	








































reforming	 laws	 to	meet	 the	needs	and	desires	of	 individuals	and	communities	 re-
quires	 the	keen	“aesthetic	apprehension	of	quality”	mentioned	above	as	much	as	





ence;	he	 refused	 to	separate	 the	 rational	and	 the	aesthetic,	although	 the	aesthetic	











circulation	and	breathe	life	into	it	 .	.	.	 for	democracy	is	 the	name	for	a	life	of	 free	and	





conceptually	and	analyzed	rationally;	 its	 functioning	must	be	 investigated	empiri-
cally.	Achieving	the	democratic	way	of	life	is	at	the	same	time	an	art	and	a	science.	
In	Nature and Experience,	Dewey	points	out
[that]	 science	 is	 an	art,	 that	 art	 is	practice[,]	 .	.	.	 that	 art	—	the	mode	of	activity	 that	 is	

























































annual	 meeting	 of	 the	American	 Political	 Science	Association.	 Since	 then,	 it	 has	
u	ndergone	several	major	revisions.	I	thank	Leigh	Jenko	and	the	anonymous	r	eviewers	
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